Introduction: The Middle East is one of the most unstable regions within the international system, where instability is chronically and structurally reproduced. This condition should be understood as the outcome of the fragile architecture of the regional order. The primary objective of this article is to explain the roots of fragility in the regional order and to identify the mechanisms through which it is reproduced within the Regional Order Control Structure.

Method: This study is fundamental research and employs a combined methodological approach, integrating historical-structural analysis with system dynamics analysis for data analysis. Drawing upon Robert Jervis’s framework of complex systems, the study examines the Middle East as an open, nonlinear, and deeply interconnected system. The research process encompasses the collection of qualitative data; the identification of foundational variables across three levels (internal, intermediate, and external); the analysis of feedback mechanisms, systemic lock-in, and path dependence as key mechanisms underlying the reproduction of order fragility in the Middle East; and, ultimately, the construction of a systemic model of the region’s fragile order architecture.

Results and Discussion: The findings of this study indicate that instability in the Middle East results from the feedback-driven interaction of variables at three levels: internal, intermediate, and external. At the internal level, the intersection of geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural networks, the polarization of power, identity tensions, and structural imbalances create the conditions for the emergence of competing and fragile sub-orders. At the intermediate level, the dysfunctionality of regional security regimes, the fluidity of alignments, the diversity of threats, and competitive relations among actors intensify cycles of mistrust and reciprocal balancing. At the external level, intervention by extra-regional powers, the decline of U.S. hegemony, and Washington’s strategic reorientation toward the Pacific region have contributed to the emergence of porous security networks and intensified competition over the control of the regional order. Recent developments, including the crisis of October 7, 2023, the 12-day and 40-day wars, and the weakening of the U.S. security umbrella, have further increased the complexity and exacerbated the intensity of this situation.

Systemic analysis also demonstrates that these variables do not operate independently; rather, they influence one another through nonlinear relationships, cascading effects, and feedback loops. The security dilemma and the spiral of hostility generate self-rein forcing cycles of competition and mistrust, while the domino model transmits the consequences of crises to other parts of the regional network. At the same time, path-dependence and Systemic Lock-in increase the costs of changing established patterns and constrain regional actors’ ability to exit dysfunctional cycles of competition and balancing.

Conclusion: The fragility of the Middle East’s order architecture is not merely the result of episodic crises or tactical errors, but a product of the regional system’s interconnected structure and self-reproducing mechanisms. The interaction of competing networks, weak institutional arrangements, and zero-sum competition creates conditions in which actors’ security measures, through rivals’ reciprocal responses, intensify insecurity and undermine the existing equilibrium. In such circumstances, changes in power distribution or a reduced presence of an extra-regional power do not necessarily produce a stable order, as security vacuums and competition to redefine its rules can generate new cycles of instability. Reducing regional fragility therefore requires moving beyond competition and balancing alone, addressing the structural mechanisms that reproduce crises, strengthening institutional capacities for conflict management, and reconsidering regional security arrangements. As long as the architecture of order remains grounded in zero-sum confrontation and temporary equilibria, systemic lock-in will persist, and instability will remain a structural feature of the Middle East’s order-control structure.