جنگ شناختی و بازتعریف تهدید در تعارضات امنیتی: تحلیل فرآیندی تقابل جمهوری اسلامی ایران و اسرائیل

Abstract

Introduction: In an era of transforming information ecosystems and intensifying contests over semantic hegemony, strategic conflicts have transcended physical domains and expanded into the realms of cognition, perception, and collective memory. this article examines cognitive warfare as the dominant paradigm in the Iran–Israel confrontation. Within this framework, cognitive warfare is conceived as a struggle for control over the process of reality construction. The central argument holds that cognitive warfare operates not merely as a tactical instrument but as a structure that transforms the logic of confrontation into a discursive process of continuous threat construction. Accordingly, securitization is not simply a response to external threats; it is a discursive mechanism that perpetually reconstitutes the conditions of possibility for threat. The core research question asks how the discursive mechanisms of cognitive warfare shape and reproduce the process of mutual securitization in the bilateral relationship.

Method: The study employs a qualitative-analytical approach with systematic analysis of discursive data spanning 2015–2025. Purposive sampling, guided by the criteria of “dominant discourse representation” and “tension peaks,” encompasses speeches by senior officials, strategic documents, state media content (domestic, Israeli, and Western), and think-tank reports. Analysis proceeds through three coding stages: open coding (concepts such as “enemy construction”), axial coding (categorization into “civilizational resistance” and “existential threat” discourses), and theoretical coding (linkage to the securitization framework). The theoretical framework rests on three interconnected levels: at the ontological level, constructivism (Wendt) treats threat as the product of intersubjective interactions and the attribution of “self” and “other” roles; at the middle-range level, securitization theory (Buzan and Wæver) explains how ordinary phenomena are transformed into “existential threats” through speech acts; and at the micro level, critical discourse analysis (Fairclough), focusing on representation and security metaphors, dissects the production of dominant narratives. This synthesis conceptualizes cognitive warfare as a battle for discursive hegemony over the interpretive frameworks of domestic and international audiences.

Findings: Cognitive warfare follows a four-stage cycle: (1) Discourse production: Iran, through a “civilizational-identity resistance” discourse, represents itself as the symbol of an “oppressed yet steadfast umma” against a “usurping other,” while Israel, through an “existential security threat” narrative, frames Iran as an irrational threat and itself as a “rightful victim acting in self-defense.” (2) Cognitive framing: Narratives are disseminated across domestic and international levels via technological infrastructures, including proxy media, cyber operations, and artificial intelligence. (3) Strategic action: The consolidation of these representations legitimizes hard-power actions. (4) Cyclical reproduction: This process constrains non-confrontational options and reinforces a vicious cycle in which each reaction intensifies the opposing narrative. The strategic consequence is mutual discursive entrapment: the more threatening the representation of the rival's identity, the more one's own identity becomes imprisoned within an enemy-construction narrative. This path dependency progressively narrows the range of conceivable options and rigidifies cognitive frameworks to the point where exiting the cycle becomes effectively impossible. Effectiveness in cognitive warfare depends on the integration of three layers: discursive-identity (producing credible narratives), technological-informational (rapid dissemination through global networks), and resilience-control (societal immunization).

Conclusion: The findings demonstrate that cognitive warfare in the Iran–Israel confrontation has become a self-sustaining logic of conflict that, through four successive phases—production of competing discourses, shaping of strategic perception, restriction of policy options, and cognitive consolidation—steers the decision-making environment toward offensive strategies. Effectiveness in cognitive warfare depends on three factors: narrative coherence, media penetration capacity, and the actor's power base. The discursive redefinition of “threat” has played a pivotal role in legitimizing security actions. Accordingly, security is not solely a function of material power but is equally an outcome of discursive hegemony and the consolidation of dominant narratives.