The conceptual capacity of jurisprudence in response to the issue of participation in popular governance

Introduction and Objectives: In spite of numerous discussions about participation in Islamic political thought, jurisprudential conceptual capacities has received less attention in response to the issue of people's participation in governance. Considering the importance of participation in popular governance, this article examines the conceptual capacity of jurisprudence in this regard. According to the author, if this conceptual capacity is revealed, we can talk about the possibility of designing a model of popular governance in jurisprudence.

Method: Ijtihad is used in this article. Ijtihad, as a text-oriented and intellectual method, has such a capacity that it can deal with new issues and extract the Islamic point of view on these issues with a jurisprudential approach. In this article, an attempt is made to investigate the issue of participation in popular governance according to this method, in this way the capacity of jurisprudence in dealing with popular governance is clarified.

Findings: Jurisprudence has two concepts of cooperation( Taawon) and council( Shura) to prove the right of people to participate in governance. From this point of view, the participation of believers in matters related to their destiny in this world or in the hereafter, makes their cooperation inevitable in providing material and spiritual needs. Governance is a matter of partnership and the desired realization of this matter in the society requires the participation of partners. The concept of cooperation shows the right of people to participate in partnership matters such as governance.

Examining the verses and traditions about the concept of cooperation shows that, according to this concept, people have the right to participate in governance within the scope of charity. And on the other hand, people do not have the right to participate in governance within the scope of oppression. Cooperation and participation in fair governance is obligatory and on the opposite point, cooperation and participation in oppressive governance is forbidden.

In addition, the concept of Shura more clearly implies the popular nature of governance from a jurisprudential point of view. This concept, which has been considered both in the verses of the Holy Qur'an and in the traditions of the Prophet (PBUH) and the infallible imams, and seems to be a rational matter, has a suitable capacity to prove the popular nature of governance. Undoubtedly, decision-making about matters related to the general authority of society is considered one of the most important examples of governance, and the concept of council indicates the popular nature of decision-making.

From this point of view, the Shura is the most important mechanism that can provide people's participation in governance. According to this concept, the Muslim ruler is bound to refer to the opinion of the people in decision-making and cannot engage in public authority activities without paying attention to their opinion.

Conclusion: The use of the two concepts of cooperation and council shows the conceptual capacity of fiqh in dealing with participation in popular governance. Based on this, it can be concluded that jurisprudence has supported participation in popular governance by relying on these two concepts. This support brings participation in governance both as a right for the people and as a duty for the rulers.