https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/ Political and International Approaches en daily 1 Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107124.html Extended AbstractIntroduction: Given the foundational importance of ontological principles in delineating philosophical systems and scientific theories—particularly within political philosophy—this article systematically develops a theory of justice rooted in the political philosophy of Transcendental Wisdom (Hikmat Mota'aliyah). By analyzing the ontological underpinnings of justice within this school of thought, and by critically examining the source texts of its prominent figures, spanning from Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta'allihin) to contemporary commentators, this study addresses a central research question: Upon which metaphysical pillars and conceptual foundations is the ontology of justice constructed within transcendental political wisdom?Methods: Data collection was conducted via a library-based documentary method, systematically surveying the canonical works of prominent philosophers within the Transcendental Wisdom tradition. The study utilizes a text-based interpretive approach for data analysis. Initially, focusing on textual exegesis to recover the authors' intended meanings, key propositions regarding the ontology of justice were extracted from the source material. These extracted concepts were then categorized based on thematic similarity, conceptual emphasis, and the structural role they play in delineating a comprehensive system of justice. Finally, these categories were synthesized and formulated based on their direct or indirect relational links to the broader architecture of justice.Results and Discussion: To answer this question, the ontological foundations of Hikmat Mota'alih political philosophy have been extracted and organized, and their relationship to the issue of justice has been shown. Therefore, five important foundations of "rational social system", "purposeful social system", "dynamics of human society", "human society with choice", and "need of society for justice" were obtained to depict justice in Hikmat Mota'alih political philosophy in the ontological field. A structural hierarchy and sequential dependency exist among these foundations. Specifically, the inherent rationality of society necessitates its teleological (purposeful) nature, a purpose that is actualized precisely through the realization of justice. It is through the pursuit of this teleological end that the dynamics of the political system are structured, wherein the moral choices of both the individual and the community play an objective role in manifesting justice. Consequently, it is upon this ontological scaffolding that society's existential need for justice is established.Conclusions: By synthesizing and structuring these five ontological foundations, this article concludes that justice within transcendental political philosophy operates as an integrated system defined by a dialectical relationship between the virtuous individual and the virtuous society. This systemic framework guides both components within an existential pyramid that extends across all dimensions of reality toward a just ideal. Political and social life is no exception to this cosmic law; human political existence cannot flourish or survive without anchoring itself to the objective of justice, even at a minimal level. Based on the ontological premises of Hikmat Mota'aliyah, ultimate human perfection is attainable only within a just social order. Therefore, human society achieves stability and continuity only when just relations form the baseline for its inception, institutionalization, and preservation. Ultimately, the ontology of Transcendental Wisdom serves as the indispensable structural foundation for conceptualizing and designing a just society.  https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107036.html Introduction: Despite the importance of the political theory of the Islamic Republic, its Islamic and republican dimensions, as well as the position of the people, the Wali al-Faqih and governing institutions, still require a precise theoretical explanation. The lack of such a foundation may produce divergent interpretations of governance. Islamic political philosophy, especially al-Farabi’s felicity-oriented thought, offers a useful and valuable framework for re-examining political models in Islamic societies. Therefore, this article compares al-Farabi’s political theory with the political theory of the Islamic Republic in order to clarify its indicators, dimensions, and foundations, with special emphasis on the role of the people.Method: This study uses a documentary-library method for data collection and a descriptive-analytical method with a comparative approach for analysis. First, the main components of al-Farabi’s political theory are extracted from his works and reliable scholarly sources. These components are then compared with the theoretical foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially regarding the relationship between Islamism and republicanism, the role of the people, and their relation to the Wali al-Faqih. Through conceptual analysis and structural comparison, the study seeks to present a clearer and more coherent model for explaining the political theory of the Islamic Republic.Results and Discussion: Al-Farabi, as a major Islamic philosopher and theorist of the virtuous city, seriously addressed the role of the people in political life. By proposing the theory of social cooperation, he regarded government as serving the people and their perfection, rather than viewing the people as serving government. In this respect, his theory distances itself from classical paternalism. At the same time, he rejected democracy as a form of the ignorant city and considered it rooted in irrational desires. His description of the democratic city resembles modern liberal-democratic societies: people are free and equal, no one has superiority over another, desires are diverse, and society contains many different groups. In such a city, the ruler is chosen according to the will of the people, who consider his position dependent on their selection.The Islamic Republic also seeks to combine divine sovereignty with the people’s role in government. On the one hand, it emphasizes Islamic authority through the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, which may bring it close to paternalism. On the other hand, by stressing the people’s participation and authority in the realization of government, it moves away from paternalistic models. However, it does not define its republican dimension as borrowed from modern democracy, but as rooted in Islamic teachings and Qur’anic principles, such as “He believes in Allah and believes the believers” (Qur’an 9:61). In this framework, the people are not merely symbolic; rather, they form the basis for the exercise of political legitimacy. Thus, this theory differs from interpretations such as “acceptance–legitimacy” or “ummah–imamate.”Conclusion: The article argues that al-Farabi’s political theory is close to the political theory of the Islamic Republic. This theory is compatible neither with paternalism nor with modern democracy. Rather, it represents an independent model that may be called people-centered divine sovereignty . https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107034.html Introduction:The Constitutional Revolution in Iran can be understood not merely as a political event, but as an “epistemological arena” in which the confrontation of three symbolic horizons ultimately shaped the fate of the movement. Foundational concepts such as law, nation, freedom, sovereignty, and representation—each of which carried specific institutional meanings and functions within European modernity—became sites of semantic struggle in Qajar-era Iran. The three principal social forces of the revolution—namely the clergy, theoretical intellectuals, and instrumental intellectuals—each interpreted and redefined these concepts from markedly different perspectives. The absence of a convergent semantic field meant that this plurality of interpretations, rather than generating synergy, culminated in a structural conflict, the apex of which was the bombardment of the parliament. The failure to consolidate constitutional institutions was not solely the result of structural weaknesses or foreign interventions; it also had deep roots in the absence of “semantic consensus” among the three main social forces. Although all three groups employed a shared vocabulary—such as “law,” “freedom,” and “nation”—they reproduced these concepts in mutually contradictory ways within the field of symbolic interaction. This study seeks to answer why constitutionalism in Iran failed to produce a symbolic consensus among the social forces that supported it.Methods:Drawing on the theoretical framework of Herbert Blumer and the approach of symbolic interactionism, this study reinterprets the Iranian Constitutional Revolution as a میدان of contestation over the construction of meaning surrounding key concepts. It employs qualitative text analysis to examine treatises, periodicals, and writings by both intellectuals and clerics, with the aim of identifying how actors endowed constitutional concepts with meaning and how they engaged in dialogue and negotiation over them within the public sphere. To operationalize this objective, the study maps three major intellectual currents in an analytical table (including categories such as conceptions of law, relations to tradition and the West, the ultimate aims of constitutionalism, and the ideal political subject), and offers a close reading of symbolic disputes—particularly competing interpretations of the concept of the “House of Justice.” Results and discussion:Three distinct meaning-making projects can be identified within the Constitutional Revolution. “Theoretical intellectuals” prioritized a form of legalism grounded in rationality and the discourse of natural rights, conceiving the citizen as the primary locus of autonomy and collective reason. “Instrumental intellectuals,” by contrast, emphasized administrative order and state capacity, aiming to design a disciplined and efficient bureaucracy alongside a centralized nation-state. The clergy, on the other hand, advanced a framework known as “legitimate constitutionalism” (mashruteh-ye mashru‘eh), within which concepts such as law, justice, and sovereignty were redefined under the rubric of Islamic jurisprudence, with the preservation of the moral order of Islam as their goal; they viewed the believer as the normative subject. This tripartite configuration helps explain why shared symbols failed to yield a unified semantic stability. The discourse of mashru‘eh challenged liberal-secular readings of constitutionalism, while the state-building approach of instrumental intellectuals steered the constitutional project toward centralization and technocracy. The result was not a pre-agreed synthesis, but a persistent “semantic misalignment” that weakened the durability of alliances and hindered the institutional consolidation of constitutionalism.In the absence of a shared political language, the process of integrating tradition and modernity failed, producing a heterogeneous outcome composed of modern institutions, traditional elements, and state authoritarianism.Conclusion:The trajectory of the Constitutional movement in Iran cannot be explained solely by structural constraints, since political projects endure only when institutions and shared meanings evolve in tandem. In the absence of a common political language capable of mediating among tradition, modernity, and statehood, constitutionalism became fragmented: legally modern in appearance, normatively contested, and administratively state-centric. https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107035.html Introduction and Aims: India's vast economic interests and desire to play a greater regional role have forced India to pay special attention to the Central Asian region in competition with countries such as China and Pakistan. Due to lack of geographical proximity, if India can establish its position in Afghanistan, it can gain stable access to Central Asia through the country's territory. For this reason, during the twenty-year occupation, India has tried to establish stability and security in Afghanistan and has been in conflict with the Taliban group. Now, With the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan, India's challenges have doubled, because Pakistan, which is located to the west of India, is an ally of the Taliban and is blocking India's land connection with Afghanistan. Thus, India must first establish friendly relations with the Taliban, and secondly, to reach Afghan territory, it must bypass Pakistan, which is the most important alternative route to Iran's Chabahar port. The purpose of this study is to examine India's challenges and the role of Afghanistan and Iran in India's strategy to reach Central Asia. The question is, what challenges does India have to overcome to reach the Central Asian region?Methods: The present study used a descriptive-analytical method to test the hypothesis. In this regard, first of all, the geopolitics of the region, its geographical location and obstacles are described as they are, and the events and developments in the region are described as they occurred. Next, using data obtained from various sources, we analyze India's goals, motivations, and efforts to overcome the challenges of reaching Central Asia, as well as the role of Afghanistan and Iran in this regard. At this stage, the relationship between the independent variables (the role of Afghanistan and Iran) and the dependent variables (India's access to Central Asia) is analyzed. The data was also collected in a library manner.Findings: India’s closest path to influencing Central Asia is through Afghanistan, which must be stable, secure, and aligned with India’s interests to serve as a viable transit corridor. But India lacks direct access and must rely on Iran or Pakistan. Pakistan, fearing India’s rise in Afghanistan and Central Asia, blocks Indian transit, forcing India to seek alternative routes—foremost Iran’s Chabahar port. After the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, Pakistan’s influence in Kabul grew, compelling India to gradually rebuild ties with the Taliban to protect its interests, counter Pakistan, and maintain access toward Central Asia. Yet China–Pakistan influence in Afghanistan and the wider region continues to challenge India. Thus, New Delhi has pursued friendly relations with Iran and lobbied for U.S. sanctions waivers, recognizing Iran’s critical role—through Chabahar and broader regional connectivity—in India’s strategy to reach Central Asia.Conclusions: India must overcome significant challenges to advance its strategic goals in the third circle of its foreign policy and to secure influence in Central Asia. Success in this region requires strong relations with both Afghanistan and Iran, as well as contributing to regional peace and stability. Given Pakistan’s obstruction and China’s growing presence, cooperation among India, Afghanistan, and Iran becomes essential, especially through the development of Chabahar Port, which benefits all three: the Taliban can attract investment and rebuild infrastructure; Iran gains economic advantages and balances China and India; and India gains reliable access to Afghanistan and onward to Central Asia. Through this trilateral cooperation, India can effectively pursue its regional ambitions. https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_106902.html Russia's invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, coupled with the United States' decision from the early years of the second decade of the twenty-first century to reduce its financial commitments to global security, have compelled Germany to redefine its international role in the pursuit of its foreign policy. More precisely, the quality of relations and the strategic choices of major powers—particularly the United States and Russia—over the past decade have profoundly influenced the outcomes of the international system, leading German policymakers between 2014 and 2025 to perceive their country within a novel and distinct structure of international power distribution. Consequently, they no longer view themselves merely as agents enforcing the international order but rather believe they bear the responsibility to engage proactively within it through self-initiated actions. The most evident manifestation of this shift from a role as a subservient executor to a guardian of the international order is Germany's movement toward a security-oriented foreign policy, marked by the emergence of a militarized dimension—a phenomenon that the present study seeks to elucidate through the lens of neoclassical realist theory. Within this framework, the central question posed is: Why has Germany's foreign policy undergone a security-oriented transformation in its shift from a subservient executor to a guardian of the international order? To address this question, the hypothesis under examination in this paper posits that international developments during the 2014–2025 period have reshaped the role of "leaders' beliefs, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions in Germany" in advancing this country's foreign policy, thereby strengthening the prominence of security and military considerations within its overarching foreign policy strategy and outcomes.In this paper, to gather relevant data for testing the hypothesis, a case study approach was employed, focusing on specific revisionist actions and measures in Germany's recent foreign and security policy. This involved document analysis, including the examination of primary and secondary sources, as well as in-depth interpretations of these documents. Given that the collected data are qualitative in nature, qualitative content analysis was utilized as the analytical method. Furthermore, the argumentative foundation rests on hypothesis testing; in this regard, a prominent theory in foreign policy studies—neoclassical realism—is applied to Germany's foreign policy over the 2014–2025 period.Over the past decade, the "structural modifiers" of the international system have intensified dramatically, creating a divergent context for the variable influences at the systemic level. The impacts of these modifiers are so profound that, from Germany's perspective, the contemporary world is mired more in disorder than order, rendering the adoption of optimal policies for confronting it an imperative. According to neoclassical realism, these modifiers have influenced domestic components—such as leaders' beliefs, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions—fostering the conviction and practical outcome that Germany stands at a historical turning point, or Zeitenwende, necessitating a more active and independent agency in shaping the emerging global order and transitioning from a mere executor of the system to its architect. This perception has led to transformations in Germany's foreign policy outputs and a redefinition of its foundational pillars, encompassing transatlantic relations, European integration, Ostpolitik, and the assumption of a role as a normal military power.The research findings indicate that sustained pressures on the country have elevated discussions regarding Germany's transformation into a normal power—embracing leadership and international responsibilities commensurate with its stature—from mere discursive themes among diverse stakeholders, such as political parties, parliament, social groups, and elites, to an executable process within its security and foreign policy circles. With the proclamation of this historical turning point, Berlin has embarked on the path toward becoming a modern power equipped with military forces possessing deterrent capabilities. https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107037.html AbstractIntroduction: In an era of transforming information ecosystems and intensifying contests over semantic hegemony, strategic conflicts have transcended physical domains and expanded into the realms of cognition, perception, and collective memory. this article examines cognitive warfare as the dominant paradigm in the Iran–Israel confrontation. Within this framework, cognitive warfare is conceived as a struggle for control over the process of reality construction. The central argument holds that cognitive warfare operates not merely as a tactical instrument but as a structure that transforms the logic of confrontation into a discursive process of continuous threat construction. Accordingly, securitization is not simply a response to external threats; it is a discursive mechanism that perpetually reconstitutes the conditions of possibility for threat. The core research question asks how the discursive mechanisms of cognitive warfare shape and reproduce the process of mutual securitization in the bilateral relationship.Method: The study employs a qualitative-analytical approach with systematic analysis of discursive data spanning 2015–2025. Purposive sampling, guided by the criteria of “dominant discourse representation” and “tension peaks,” encompasses speeches by senior officials, strategic documents, state media content (domestic, Israeli, and Western), and think-tank reports. Analysis proceeds through three coding stages: open coding (concepts such as “enemy construction”), axial coding (categorization into “civilizational resistance” and “existential threat” discourses), and theoretical coding (linkage to the securitization framework). The theoretical framework rests on three interconnected levels: at the ontological level, constructivism (Wendt) treats threat as the product of intersubjective interactions and the attribution of “self” and “other” roles; at the middle-range level, securitization theory (Buzan and Wæver) explains how ordinary phenomena are transformed into “existential threats” through speech acts; and at the micro level, critical discourse analysis (Fairclough), focusing on representation and security metaphors, dissects the production of dominant narratives. This synthesis conceptualizes cognitive warfare as a battle for discursive hegemony over the interpretive frameworks of domestic and international audiences.Findings: Cognitive warfare follows a four-stage cycle: (1) Discourse production: Iran, through a “civilizational-identity resistance” discourse, represents itself as the symbol of an “oppressed yet steadfast umma” against a “usurping other,” while Israel, through an “existential security threat” narrative, frames Iran as an irrational threat and itself as a “rightful victim acting in self-defense.” (2) Cognitive framing: Narratives are disseminated across domestic and international levels via technological infrastructures, including proxy media, cyber operations, and artificial intelligence. (3) Strategic action: The consolidation of these representations legitimizes hard-power actions. (4) Cyclical reproduction: This process constrains non-confrontational options and reinforces a vicious cycle in which each reaction intensifies the opposing narrative. The strategic consequence is mutual discursive entrapment: the more threatening the representation of the rival's identity, the more one's own identity becomes imprisoned within an enemy-construction narrative. This path dependency progressively narrows the range of conceivable options and rigidifies cognitive frameworks to the point where exiting the cycle becomes effectively impossible. Effectiveness in cognitive warfare depends on the integration of three layers: discursive-identity (producing credible narratives), technological-informational (rapid dissemination through global networks), and resilience-control (societal immunization).Conclusion: The findings demonstrate that cognitive warfare in the Iran–Israel confrontation has become a self-sustaining logic of conflict that, through four successive phases—production of competing discourses, shaping of strategic perception, restriction of policy options, and cognitive consolidation—steers the decision-making environment toward offensive strategies. Effectiveness in cognitive warfare depends on three factors: narrative coherence, media penetration capacity, and the actor's power base. The discursive redefinition of “threat” has played a pivotal role in legitimizing security actions. Accordingly, security is not solely a function of material power but is equally an outcome of discursive hegemony and the consolidation of dominant narratives. https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107122.html Introduction and Objectives: Over the past three decades, Afghanistan has been one of the principal subjects on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). From the imposition of sanctions on the Taliban in 1999 to the establishment of international military forces, the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), support for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and the management of the consequences of the Taliban’s return to power, the Security Council has adopted numerous resolutions addressing security, political, humanitarian, and peacebuilding issues. Nevertheless, the persistence of political instability, the expansion of armed insurgent activities, and ultimately the collapse of the republican regime in 2021 raises an important question: to what extent have Security Council decisions influenced developments in Afghanistan, and which factors have determined the effectiveness of those decisions?The present study seeks to answer the question of which variables have shaped the influence of United Nations Security Council decisions in Afghanistan and what roles domestic, regional, and international actors have played in the implementation or non-implementation of those decisions. To address this question, the article develops a theoretical framework entitled the **“Volatile Compliance Model in Fragile States.”** By integrating Fragile State Theory, International Compliance Theory, Constructivism, Dependency Theory, and Realism, the model argues that compliance with international institutional decisions in fragile states is neither a unified nor a linear process. Rather, it is conditioned by state capacity, societal normative cleavages, competition among domestic actors, governmental dependence on external support, and rivalry among regional and international powers. Accordingly, the weaker a state’s institutional cohesion and capacity to exercise authority, the more fragmented and volatile compliance with international decisions becomes.Method: This study employs a mixed-method approach combining descriptive-analytical and survey research designs. Empirical data were collected through questionnaires distributed among university professors in the provinces of Kabul, Herat, and Balkh. Given the non-normal distribution of the data, Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient was used to examine the relationships among the variables. The dependent variable is the **influence of United Nations Security Council decisions**, while the independent variables consist of a range of domestic, regional, and international actors.Findings: The findings indicate that compliance with Security Council decisions in Afghanistan has not been uniform across different actors. The executive branch, formal political parties, and civil society organizations exhibited the highest levels of convergence with Security Council decisions, whereas the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other anti-government armed groups demonstrated the greatest degree of divergence. At the regional level, actors’ behavior was influenced less by the legal legitimacy of Security Council resolutions than by geopolitical and security considerations. The statistical results confirm that the success or failure of Security Council decisions in Afghanistan has largely depended on patterns of compliance and resistance among a network of domestic and external actors.Conclusion: The principal theoretical contribution of this study is the development of the “Volatile Compliance Model in Fragile States”. The model demonstrates that, in conflict-affected and fragile states, the influence of international institutions is contingent upon both the state’s capacity to exercise authority and the degree of cooperation exhibited by influential actors toward international objectives. From this perspective, the Afghan experience represents an important case illustrating the limitations of international governance when confronting fragmented and fragile states.Keywords: Afghanistan; United Nations Security Council; Fragile State; International Compliance; Taliban; Volatile Compliance Model. https://piaj.sbu.ac.ir/article_107123.html Introduction: Since the end of the Cold War,the overlap between technological innovations and geopolitical transformations has fundamentally altered the foundations of the classical understanding of “deterrence.”The transition from a deterrence logic based on arms accumulation and hard power toward network-centric architectures and algorithmic governance indicates the entry into a new era of military strategy. In this regard,the Russia-Ukraine war, beyond being a regional conflict, has become a real test for assessing the efficacy of combining “non-human technologies” and artificial intelligence on the battlefield. The main research question is:How has the integration of artificial intelligence into the networked architecture of Russian weaponry upgraded this country’s technological deterrence capability in the Ukraine war? The aim of this study is to explain Russia’s transition from traditional deterrence to data-driven deterrence and to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of this new architecture.Methods: This research was conducted using a “qualitative” approach based on the conceptual model of “Layered Analysis of Technological Deterrence.”Data collection was performed via library and documentary methods at two levels: first, extracting and coding data from official defense texts, strategic studies center reports, and field evidence from the Ukraine war;and second, a comparative analysis of the configuration of Russia’s network-centric systems with a focus on missile defense architecture and sensing and fire networks. To analyze the data, the “Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act” (OODA) loop model was used to represent operational processes, and findings were interpreted into the conceptual pattern of deterrence using thematic analysis and data-command relationship mapping. This method provided the possibility of evaluating causal links and assessing the sustainability of technological advantage in high-intensity combat environments.Results and discussions: By intertwining weapon systems engineering and artificial intelligence,Russia has operationalized a new paradigm of military intelligence that, instead of mimicking human cognition, relies on computational power for “prediction and preemptive action.”Technical examinations reveal that this networked architecture is formed through the integration of smart defensive and offensive systems such as the “S-500” system, “9M729” missiles,and the “Avangard” hypersonic glider with surveillance and processing networks including “Orlan” UAVs and the “SORM” network; a complex structure in which data from multi-source sensors (from satellites to radar), after aggregation, connects directly to the fire chain via real-time processing loops within Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance(C4ISR)systems.The deployment of this integrated ecosystem, while transferring the initiative to the network, has reduced the classical decision-to-action cycle from a scale of hours to minutes.There is a direct correlation between the capacity to absorb and indigenize artificial intelligence in military infrastructure and the enhancement of Russia’s multi-domain reaction capability, such that defense effectively serves the offense;although findings indicate that this very complexity and network dependency has also entailed a level of systemic vulnerability to data leakage and electronic warfare threats.Conclusion: Russia has managed to shift the balance of power in its favor at tactical and operational levels by transitioning from purely nuclear deterrence toward “algorithmic field superiority.”The “Active Multi-Domain Deterrence” model explicated in this research shows that security and deterrence in the 21st century depend more on proficiency in designing integrated networks and data management in hostile environments than on weapon accumulation.However, the experience of the Ukraine war proved that over-reliance on technology without information hardening and considering supply chain limitations (stemming from sanctions) can lead to “strategic vulnerability.”The theoretical implication of this research for International Relations literature is the necessity of revising deterrence theories and moving toward “Human-Machine-Data” hybrid models.For defense policymakers,Russia’s experience offers a model of how to achieve asymmetric deterrence through the smartening of conventional weapons, which, of course,requires continuous cyber protection.