Introduction and Objectives: Despite apparent consensus on the value of equality, its definition, scope, and how to achieve it are subject to serious controversy. Marxism, emphasizing equality of outcome and collective ownership, and liberalism, emphasizing equality of opportunity and meritocracy, have presented definitions that face serious criticism. Professor Morteza Motahari (1979-1979), facing socialist, liberal, and eclectic currents, attempted to provide a local yet universal answer by relying on transcendental wisdom. Despite extensive research on justice in Motahari's thought, less attention has been paid to the relationship between his philosophical anthropology and the theory of equality. The main purpose is to explain this relationship and show how foundations such as substantial movement, natural rights, and human dignity have led to an alternative theory of equality that is neither Marxist nor liberal, but outlines a new path based on the existential transformation of man.

Methods: Using documentary content analysis with an interpretive approach, this research examines Motahari's written works based on the author's intention and in the context of his time, comparing his views with those of Jonathan Wolff, who proposed an "egalitarian spirit" to present an inter-thinking approach.

Findings: Motahari considers equality not as a fixed state, but as an existential process shaped in society. The first basis, substantial movement, considers existence as having inherent levels and differences. Motahari accepts difference as the basis for social evolution and distinguishes it from discrimination. Natural differences are not obstacles to equality, but conditions for social movement and collective perfection. The second basis is natural rights, which, based on the teleology of creation, provides a supra-social foundation for equality that is neither purely contractual nor deterministic. From Motahari's perspective, natural rights are determined by creation, and every natural talent is a document for a natural right. The third component is mutual conquest, which, in critiquing Marxism, proposes mutual benefit without exploitation as an alternative to class-based employment. By distinguishing conquest from determinism, Motahari shows that human society, unlike animal societies, is a field for free competition. The fourth and most important component is human dignity, with its "divine self" and "natural self," introducing equality as a gradual existential process. The closer humans come to their divine self, the more feasible equality becomes, and this inner transformation leads to "emotional cooperation" and voluntary brotherhood, elevating equality beyond distributive justice. By emphasizing the state's role in providing equal opportunities and emotional cooperation in realizing equality, Motahari presents a two-faceted model attending to both external structures and internal developments.

Conclusion: Motahari's theory leads neither to suppressing individual freedom (Marxism) nor to neglecting social structures (liberalism). Relying on dynamic anthropology, it offers a way to realize equality in the shadow of difference, whose departure is change in the human self and whose destination is a society based on brotherhood and voluntary moral responsibility. Comparing Motahari with Wolff shows both thinkers emphasize human relationships and empathy, but Motahari grounds these in transcendent human dignity, elevating equality from a distributive issue to a moral-existential duty. This achievement enriches Islamic political philosophy and can inspire contemporary theorizing about social justice.