ابتکار 1+16: راهبرد همکاری چین و کشورهای اروپای مرکزی و شرقی

نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانش اموخته دکتری، دانشگاه خوارزمی

2 دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه خوارزمی

10.29252/piaj.2023.226020.1206

چکیده

سیاست خارجی چین در ادامه طرح­های اقتصادی چندجانبه خود در عرصه بین‌الملل همچون؛ «کمربند - ­راه»، «ساخت چین 2025»، «جاده ابریشم سلامت»، «بانک سرمایه­گذاری زیرساخت آسیا» و...، همکاری با کشورهای اروپایی را مدنظر قرار داده است. پکن در دهه اخیر، سازوکارها و ابتکارات چندجانبه را در سطح منطقه­ای، فرامنطقه­ای و دوجانبه (کشورهای محوری) ایجاد کرد و در قالب این ابتکارات، اهداف اقتصادی، سیاسی، فرهنگی را با مناطق مختلف از جمله اروپا دنبال می‌کند. در همین چارچوب، «ابتکار 1+16» در سال 2012 به‌عنوان مکمل «کمربند-­راه» از سوی چین و کشورهای اروپای مرکزی و شرقی برای توسعه همکاری چندجانبه تعریف شد. هدف این مقاله تبیین تأثیر این ابتکار چندجانبه بر همکاری چین و کشورهای اروپای شرقی و مرکزی است و با روش قیاسی-تبیینی به این پرسش پاسخ‌ داده‌ شده که ابتکار چندجانبه 1­+16 چگونه زمینه همکاری درهم‌تنیده بین چین و کشورهای اروپای مرکزی و شرقی (سی­ای­ای) را مهیا کرده است؟ فرضیه این است که مکانیسم چندجانبه 1+16 شبکه­ی پیچیده­ای از همکاری را بین طرفین ایجاد کرده که منجر به دستاورد مثبت در حوزه­های موضوعی مشخص شده است. یافته­ها نشان می­دهد که چین در قالب بازی برد-برد پروژه­ها و طرح­ها را با همکاری گروه­های مختلف کشورهای فوق (بالکان، ویشگراد، کشورهای محوری) برنامه­ریزی و عملیاتی کرده که واکنش سایر رقبای چین را در پی داشته است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

16+1 Initiative: Cooperation strategy between China and Central and Eastern European countries

نویسندگان [English]

  • mohsen keshvarian azad 1
  • Mobarakeh sedaghati 2
1 PhD of International Relations,Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Kharazmi University
2 Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law & Political Sciences, Kharazmi University
چکیده [English]

China's foreign policy continues its multilateral economic plans in the international arena such as; "Belt and Road Initiative", "Made in China 2025", " Health Silk Road", "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" and..., have considered cooperation with European countries. In the last decade, Beijing has established multilateral mechanisms and initiatives at the regional, transregional and bilateral (pivot countries) levels and in the form of these multilateral initiatives, it includes economic, political, and cultural dimensions with different regions, especially Europe. In this framework, the "16+1 Initiative" was defined in 2012 as a complement to the " Belt and Road " by China and Central and Eastern European countries to develop multilateral cooperation. The purpose of this article is to explain the impact of this multilateral initiative on the cooperation between China and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and the question of how the multilateral initiative 1+16 is the context of the interwoven cooperation between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CE E) has prepared? The hypothesis is that the 16+1 multilateral mechanism has created a complex network of cooperation between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which has led to positive achievements in specific subject areas. The findings show that China has planned and implemented projects and plans in the form of a win-win game with the cooperation of various groups of the above countries (Balkans, Visegrad, Axis countries), which has resulted in the reaction of other Chinese competitors.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • China
  • 16+1
  • Multilateralism
  • Europe
  • Cooperation
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