Reconsidering Isaiah Berlin’s Theory of Liberty: Hermeneutic Lessons for Contemporary Iranian Thought

Introduction: Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty constitutes one of the most significant theoretical contributions to the field of freedom, generating a diverse range of both supportive and critical scholarly responses. However, the majority of works analyzing and explicating this theory have developed their philosophical and logical critiques without first achieving a sympathetic understanding of Berlin's broader intellectual project or appreciating his particular perspective on liberty within its original context. In reality, Berlin inaugurated a new direction in the revival of twentieth-century political philosophy, leaving a profound impact on the discourse of freedom. Accordingly, this study aims, first, to provide a comprehensive account of the evolution of his theory, and second, to derive practical lessons from his intellectual trajectory for contemporary intellectual reflection within Iranian society.
Methods: This paper employs Quentin Skinner’s hermeneutic methodology to elucidate the meaning-making process underlying Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty. The analysis explicates Skinner’s methodological framework and its operational implications before applying it directly to Berlin’s texts. Following this method, the analysis focuses initially on the political and social context and subsequently on the theoretical background of the era in which Berlin produced his speech acts. This approach allows for a precise depiction of the historical and discursive milieu of the period. Once the conditions and motivations for Berlin’s communicative acts are clarified, the analysis examines his intended "communicative action."
Results and Discussion: By proposing the distinction between positive and negative liberty and offering his unique interpretation, Berlin was engaging in a communicative act aimed at confronting totalitarian ideologies and defending the tenets of liberal freedom. This primary objective suggests that we should moderate the predominantly critical debates concerning the possibility of separating these two concepts and the various philosophical and logical objections raised, as Berlin’s main concern was not to advance a purely academic discussion. Instead, he sought to protect and delineate modern freedom, which, in his view, was facing an acutely alarming challenge with the rise and expansion of totalitarianism.
Conclusion: What emerges from Berlin's intellectual trajectory is the insight that theorizing—both generally and specifically in relation to liberty—is fundamentally an identity-laden process, made possible only through the theorist's active engagement within the sphere of social practice. Consequently, an Iranian intellectual can only engage in theorizing for Iran by acknowledging and leveraging their Iranian-Islamic identity, and by achieving a precise understanding of their intellectual "other." Through this process, they can effectively position themselves relative to rival discourses, and within this intellectual struggle—which materializes in concrete social practice—they can achieve a more refined self-understanding and enter into a meaningful dialogue with their own society. At the philosophical level, identifying the core locus of contention—that is, determining where intellectual force extends into the social sphere—becomes a primary concern. Without precisely locating this core locus of contention, the researcher’s efforts devolve into fragmented endeavors that lack foundational coherence, ultimately failing to coalesce or reach completion.