A Comparative Study of Iran and China's Perspectives on the Liberal International Order and Its Impact on Bilateral Relations

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD in International Relations, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Regional Studies, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran. Iran.

Abstract

Introduction: This article critiques the prevalent perception within Iran's decision-making apparatus and among some academic elites that Iran-China relations are progressing at a high level with no significant limitations. To challenge this notion, the article presents statistical data and figures on the volume of Chinese investment in Iran and China's unexpected positions on certain sensitive issues concerning Iran. The central question posed is: why are relations between the two countries facing significant obstacles? The article argues that, although various factors contribute to China's lack of motivation in deepening ties with Iran, a key reason lies in the differing approaches of the two nations toward the liberal international order. While Iran adopts a revolutionary revisionist stance, China takes a reformist revisionist approach. To explore this issue, the article is structured into three main sections. First, it defines the liberal international order and its key components. Second, it examines the perspectives of Iran and China on these components to identify the differences and similarities between their views. Finally, it analyzes how these divergences and commonalities have impacted the stagnation in relations between the two nations.
Methods: This study employs a comparative method with a descriptive-analytical approach. The liberal international order serves as the central framework for analysis. The perspectives of Iran and China toward this order are compared to assess how their differences and similarities influence the dynamics of their bilateral relations.
Results and Discussion: Differences in how Iran and China perceive the liberal international order are a key factor contributing to the slowdown in their bilateral relations. Iran adopts a revolutionary revisionist stance, fundamentally challenging the structure of the liberal order, whereas China takes a reformist revisionist approach, seeking to adjust and improve the existing framework rather than overthrow it. This divergence has led China to exercise caution at critical junctures in its relationship with Iran. The findings of this article indicate that China's success on the global stage is largely attributed to its strategic alignment with the liberal international order. As a result, Beijing is unwilling to compromise its broader interests to accommodate Iran's more radical stance toward the international system.
Conclusion: The Islamic Republic of Iran has placed significant emphasis on its partnership with China as part of its foreign policy strategy, driven largely by its ideological and geopolitical conflict with the West. However, China’s perspective on the liberal international order differs fundamentally from Iran’s. Moreover, China often views Iran’s revolutionary approach to the global order as counterproductive to its own interests. China's positions on issues such as Iran’s nuclear program, its conflict with the United States, and its relationships with other Middle Eastern nations underscore the limits of Sino-Iranian cooperation. While Iran views China as a counterbalance to the West, Beijing prioritizes its pragmatic and globally aligned approach, which frequently results in policies unfavorable to Iran.
 

Keywords


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